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COMING CLEAN: THE EROSION OF JUVENILE MIRANDA RIGHTS IN NEW YORK STATE
The object of the juvenile process is to make men out of errant boys. In 
that process we must build upon the truth. A juvenile should be led to 
believe the decent thing is to come clean, to face the music.
Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub, Supreme Court of New Jersey, 19661
“Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition” that children 
cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Supreme Court of the United States, 20112
I. INTRODUCTION
 The stark reality of our criminal justice system is that it is f looded with juvenile 
offenders.3 In 2009, the National Center for Juvenile Justice estimated that there 
were approximately 261,600 juveniles arrested for committing violent crimes and 
1,271,900 arrested for perpetrating property crimes during that year alone.4 These 
figures have persistently hovered in this range since 2000.5 More often than not, 
each criminal arrest leads to a custodial interrogation.6 And, like adult criminal 
defendants during custodial interrogations, juvenile defendants in New York State 
are accorded the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.7 When police arrest and 
subsequently interrogate a juvenile, Miranda warnings are read aloud and produced 
in writing.8 At this point, the juvenile can either invoke his Fifth Amendment right, 
which will protect him from self-incrimination, or waive that right and speak 
“voluntarily” to his questioners.9 The moment in time in which a juvenile is 
1. In re Carlo, 225 A.2d 110, 121 (N.J. 1966) (Weintraub, J., concurring). 
2. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 
115–16 (1982)). 
3. Nat’l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Arrest Rates by Offense, Sex, and Race (1980–
2009) (2011) (on file with author).
4. Id. “Violent” crimes include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assault. Id. “Property” crimes include burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Id.
5. Id. 
6. See Allison D. Redlich et al., The Police Interrogation of Children and Adolescents, in Interrogations, 
Confessions, and Entrapment 107 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004).
7. See U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to prophylactically apprise criminal suspects 
in custody of their Fifth Amendment right to silence and Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
9. Miranda warnings typically read:
You have the right to remain silent. 
If you choose to answer questions, anything you say can and will be used against you in 
a court of law.
You have the right to consult with an attorney before you answer any questions and to 
have an attorney present with you while you answer questions.
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confronted with a Miranda waiver decision is a pivotal one, especially because “many 
children lack the psychosocial and cognitive maturity to consider the consequences 
of a waiver of rights or to reason how to make this decision.”10
 Over the past four decades, state courts have extended Fifth Amendment 
protections to juveniles because the U.S. Supreme Court has “underscored the need 
for special protections for youths, due to their presumed greater vulnerability and 
lesser capacity to understand or assert their rights during police contact.”11 In essence, 
the Court has recognized that police should treat children like children. New York, 
however, has disregarded the Supreme Court’s guidance, even though it has 
acknowledged the developmental fragility of children.12 Although New York 
recognizes “that special care must be taken to protect the rights of minors in the 
criminal justice system,”13 the safeguards in New York are insufficient to ensure 
special care is actually used by law enforcement.
 Obtaining a waiver of Miranda is a critical tool for law enforcement because it 
encourages confessions.14 But, waiving this constitutional protection without guidance 
from an attorney can jeopardize a juvenile’s best interests. The importance of a juvenile’s 
decision to either invoke or waive Miranda protections is one that section 305.2 of the 
New York Family Court Act (FCA) acknowledges.15 It requires police officers to 
“immediately notify the parent or other person legally responsible for the child’s care” 
If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent you at no cost to you.
If you choose to answer any questions you have the right to stop answering at any time. 
Having these rights in mind, will you waive your rights and answer my questions?
 Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Children from 
Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 431, 431–32 
(2006) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79). 
10. Id. at 475. 
11. Thomas Grisso, Adolescents’ Decision Making: A Developmental Perspective on Constitutional Provisions in 
Delinquency Cases, 32 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 3, 5 (2006) (citing In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1 (1967)). 
12. See In re Jimmy D., 15 N.Y.3d 417, 422 (2010) (stating that “[t]he emotional and intellectual immaturity 
of a juvenile creates an obvious need for the advice of a guardian . . . at an interrogation from which 
charges of juvenile delinquency may ensue,” while upholding the admissibility of a thirteen-year-old’s 
confession even though he was separated from his mother at the time (alteration in original) (quoting  In re 
Michelet P., 419 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707 (2d Dep’t 1979))). 
13. Id. at 421.
14. See Redlich et al., supra note 6, at 109 (noting that the main objective of law enforcement during an 
interrogation is to get the suspect to confess).
15. The FCA provides, in part:
A child shall not be questioned pursuant to this section unless he and a person required to 
be notified pursuant to subdivision three if present, have been advised: (a) of the child’s 
right to remain silent; (b) that the statements made by the child may be used in a court of 
law; (c) of the child’s right to have an attorney present at such questioning; and (d) of the 
child’s right to have an attorney provided for him without charge if he is indigent.
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 305.2(7) (McKinney 2011).
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after an arrest and prior to any questioning.16 However, the FCA does not require the 
parent to attend the interrogation, nor does it obligate even an interested party, like an 
attorney or social worker, to be present.17 The FCA simply requires that a parental 
figure be “notified” and “advised” of both the arrest and the juvenile’s Miranda rights.18 
For instance, if a parent or guardian is unavailable or unwilling to accompany the 
juvenile during the interrogation, the FCA provides that a “minor has the capacity to 
make a voluntary confession.”19 An adjudicating family court in New York will 
determine the admissibility of the confession and subsequent inculpatory statements 
based on a “totality of the circumstances” test, which considers the juvenile’s age, 
intelligence, education, experience, and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect 
of his or her statement.20 But, compared to other jurisdictions, New York’s totality of 
the circumstances test for determining whether a juvenile has made a valid waiver is 
less protective of the rights that Miranda sought to ensure. For example, New Jersey, 
Vermont, and Texas provide additional safeguards in the form of mandatory factors for 
consideration in their waiver admissibility tests that include consideration of young 
age,21 consultation with adults not associated with the police, and approval of waiver 
from a neutral party, respectively.22
 In an effort to create a law that is more protective of juveniles, and to find a 
palatable approach for the New York State legislature, both fiscally and practically, I 
first propose that the presence of a parent should not be a mandatory consideration 
under the court’s totality of the circumstances analysis. Second, the presence or absence 
of an attorney during an interrogation should be a required factor holding the greatest 
weight, alongside a juvenile’s age, in the FCA analysis. Third, while family courts may 
consider additional factors to determine the admissibility of a juvenile’s statements after 
Miranda waiver, New York State should impose a per se bar within the FCA that 
specifically prevents Miranda waivers obtained without the presence of an attorney or, 
16. Fam. Ct. § 305.2(3).
17. Fam. Ct. § 305.2(3), (7). “A minor has the capacity to make a voluntary confession, without the presence 
or consent of counsel or other responsible adult, and the admissibility of such a confession depends not 
on his or her age alone . . . .” Paul M. Coltoff et al., 31 N.Y. Jur., Crim. Law: Proc. § 663 (2d ed. 
2011) (citing People v. Stephen J.B., 23 N.Y.2d 611 (1969)). 
18. Fam. Ct. § 305.2(7).
19. Coltoff et al., supra note 17, § 663 (citing Stephen J.B., 23 N.Y.2d 611). 
20. Id. It is important to note that the FCA mandates that certain totality factors be considered like the 
“child’s age, the presence or absence of his parents or other persons legally responsible for his care and 
[parental] notification [requirement].” Fam. Ct. § 305.2(8). However, New York jurisprudence has 
recognized additional, non-exclusive factors such as the juvenile’s age, intelligence, education, 
experience, and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his or her statement. In re Abraham R., 
No. D-19746/08, 2009 WL 750179, at *10 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Mar. 20, 2009) (“These factors are not 
exclusive and a court may consider any other relevant evidence bearing upon the question of 
voluntariness.” (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979))).
21. Taken here to mean any youth under fourteen years old.
22. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
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alternatively, an interested adult,23 during the interrogation of a juvenile under the age 
 This note first contends that the FCA wrongfully allows the parents of 
uninformed juveniles to waive their Fifth Amendment rights for them, which can 
potentially expose juveniles, especially younger juveniles (those under fourteen), to 
unknowing self-incrimination that could have been avoided had defense counsel 
been automatically appointed prior to interrogation.24 Second, this note argues that 
the FCA and New York courts fail to consider a juvenile’s age as the most dominant 
factor among those currently used, which allows a young juvenile to waive his rights 
absent any consultation with an attorney or neutral third party. Lastly, this note 
points out that the FCA’s totality of the circumstances approach to determining 
whether a juvenile has waived his right to counsel during an interrogation is 
improperly balanced because it fails to consider the most relevant factor as prescribed 
in Miranda
requirement that a young juvenile defendant consult with an attorney prior to 
interrogation, the FCA is insufficient in preserving Fifth Amendment protections 
that all defendants, including juveniles, are guaranteed. Although the totality of the 
circumstances analysis might be appropriate in circumstances involving older 
juveniles, the reviewing court should mandatorily include the presence or absence of 
defense counsel in its analysis of juveniles under fourteen.25 But this additional prong 
should not be given the same weight in its application to juveniles over the age of 
fourteen because of their more matured cognitive capacity and accompanying 
experience. Family courts analyzing waivers from older juveniles should weigh the 
“presence” factor as it would any other factor. Ultimately, New York should adopt 
New Jersey’s standard that rebalances how much weight courts apply to the totality 
of factors before the age of fourteen.
 Part II will survey the history of Miranda warnings and the admission or 
suppression of post-Miranda statements by juveniles across the United States and, 
specifically, in New York. This section will also provide an overview of three other 
states that have adopted more protective safeguards to ensure that juveniles avoid 
23. For purposes of this argument, Vermont’s definition of an “independent interested adult” is “one who is 
not only genuinely interested in the welfare of the juvenile but completely independent from and 
disassociated with the prosecution.” In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 940 (Vt. 1982).
24. Ideally, the FCA should mandate that juveniles under the age of fourteen be provided consultation with 
an attorney prior to questioning, instead of only a parent or guardian, who then may or may not be 
present during the interrogation. This argument does not suggest that those juveniles over fourteen 
most likely because of the budgetary concerns and the constraints that such a practice would have on law 
enforcement; especially because a large portion of crime in the United States is attributed to juvenile 
offenders. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
25. Additionally, the presence or absence of an attorney during an interrogation should be a required 
consideration under the FCA, and it should be given the greatest weight in the court’s analysis for juveniles 
over the age of fourteen. In all cases involving children under fourteen, the juvenile’s age should be the 
weightiest consideration, while the presence or absence of an attorney should be a close second.
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both potential police coercion and involuntary Miranda waiver. Part III will dissect 
the FCA, and contemporary case law interpreting it, to reveal the law’s constitutional 
shortcomings, especially in its application to impressionable juvenile suspects whose 
parents may lack the knowledge and foresight to consult with an attorney before 
waiving their child’s Miranda rights. Part III will also discuss how most juveniles 
misinterpret the gravity of the Miranda waiver decision, and how the state cannot 
conscionably expect valid waivers from younger children without adequate 
consultation with an attorney.
 Part IV will discuss my proposals for legislative reform and the potential impact 
those modifications will have on courts’ application and interpretation of the totality 
factors. Specifically, this note proposes that each mandatory factor be given a separate 
weight in the court’s analysis, and that one of the mandatory factors, not currently listed, 
should be the consideration of whether an attorney or independent adult was present 
prior to or during the interrogation. This section will also discuss the public policy 
implications of juveniles’ ability to avoid involuntary waivers, even if such avoidance is to 
the detriment of law enforcement. Finally, Part V will conclude with a discussion of the 
future for New York courts presiding over juvenile Miranda waiver cases.
II. THE HISTORY AND DEGENERATION OF MIRANDA FOR JUVENILES
 The Supreme Court has imposed upon law enforcement the duty to perform a 
mandatory prophylactic recitation of Fifth Amendment rights, commonly known as 
Miranda warnings, which must be read to a suspect once he is in custody.26 Such 
rights have been duly extended to juveniles.27 Based on the well-established principle 
that juveniles require additional safeguards to account for their uneven footing 
against law enforcement, many state legislatures have established legal requirements 
that protect juvenile suspects and determine whether they have voluntarily waived 
their Miranda rights before a custodial interrogation commences.28 Prior to analyzing 
the ways in which several jurisdictions, outside of New York, apply Miranda to 
juveniles, the brief discussion below provides the doctrine’s history, which is necessary 
to conceptualize how the breadth of Miranda protections have been narrowed by the 
courts and legislatures. In essence, lawmakers have tried tailoring their Miranda laws 
to account for the divergent considerations of juveniles’ age, cognitive capacity, 
New Jersey, New York’s neighboring state; Vermont, one of the nation’s more liberal 
26. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966).
27. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (“[T]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is 
applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults.”).
28. There are several examples of state laws that require police and courts to recognize that juveniles should 
be treated differently than adults during interrogations. For various examples of statutes requiring the 
presence of a parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney during a juvenile interrogation, see Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 19-2-511(1) (2010); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-137(a) (2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(b) 
(2010); W. Va. Code § 49-5-2(l) (2011). For various examples of statutes requiring that a parent, 
guardian, custodian, or attorney concur in a juvenile’s waiver decision, see Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1(1)–(2) 
(2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2333(a) (2011); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-331(2)(b)–(c) (2011).
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states;29 and Texas, a conservative state30
and court precedents could better uphold juvenile Fifth Amendment rights in New 
York State.
 A. The Supreme Court: Miranda and its Application in Juvenile Interrogations
 In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, the seminal case 
that forms the foundation of the constitutional protection from self-incrimination 
during police interrogations.31 The Court held that prior to custodial interrogations, 
police are required to warn suspects about their right to counsel and their privilege 
against self-incrimination.32 The following year, the Supreme Court decided In re 
Gault33 and extended the right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination 
to juveniles in delinquency proceedings.34 The Gault Court said that it “appreciate[ed] 
that special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf 
parents.”35 Although Gault did not explicitly apply the Miranda holding to custodial 
interrogations involving juveniles, it did hold that “[i]f counsel was not present for 
some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be 
taken to assure that the admission was voluntary . . . [and] that it was not the product 
of ignorance of rights or the adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.”36
 The Court ultimately suppressed the juvenile’s statements when it found that “[t]he 
‘confession’ of Gerald Gault was first obtained by Officer Flagg, out of the presence of 
Gerald’s parents, without counsel and without advising him of his right to silence,” 
which demonstrated the Court’s recognition of both the importance of parental 
notification and the appointment of counsel to juveniles during interrogations.37 In first 
construing Gault, courts generally applied Miranda protections to juveniles; notably, 
one court stated that “[w]hen [the] juvenile has not been given [an] opportunity for 
consultation, [with an adult, guardian, or counsel, the court] need not look to the 
29. Jeffrey M. Jones, Mississippi Rates as the Most Conservative U.S. State; Vermont, Rhode Island, District of 
Columbia Have Highest Percentages of Liberals, Gallup, Feb. 25, 2011, available at http://www.gallup.
com/poll /146348/mississippi-rates-conservative-state.aspx.
30. See Bay Area Ctr. for Voting Research, The Most Conservative and Liberal Cities in the 
United States 6–8, http://alt.coxnewsweb.com/statesman/metro/081205libs.pdf.
31. 384 U.S. 436. 
32. John B. Taylor, Right to Counsel and Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Rights and 
Liberties Under the Law 355 (2004).
33. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
34. Id. at 55; Taylor, supra note 32; Francis Barry McCarthy et al., Juvenile Law and Its 
Processes: Cases and Materials 452 (3d ed. 2003). 
35. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55 (discussing a juvenile’s waiver of Fifth Amendment protections). 
36. Id.
37. Id. at 56. 
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totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of the confession. The 
confession must be suppressed.”38 This model appeared to offer relatively strong 
protections for juvenile defendants; however, the Supreme Court’s Fare v. Michael C. 
decision subsequently reshaped how courts adjudicate juvenile waiver cases.39
 The Michael C. Court “abandoned reliance on adult guidance as the measure of 
the admissibility of a juvenile’s statement,”40 and instead broadly applied a totality of 
the circumstances test.41 Before Miranda, courts analyzed juvenile custodial 
interrogations under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis, recognizing “a juvenile’s 
need for adult counsel and guidance when subject to custodial interrogation as a 
requirement of the Due Process Clause.”42 But Michael C. applied an adult Miranda 
analysis and, in so doing, slightly modified how courts determine whether a juvenile’s 
waiver is valid under the totality of the circumstances approach.43
 Michael was a sixteen-year-old suspect in a 1976 murder-robbery in California.44 
At the time of his arrest, he was on probation and had recently served a one-year 
sentence in a youth corrections camp.45 Michael also had prior juvenile adjudications 
for burglary and purse snatching.46 When police read him the Miranda warnings, 
Michael asked if he could have his probation officer present during the interrogation.47 
The police refused to call his probation officer and told him: “If you want to talk to 
us without an attorney present, you can. If you don’t want to, you don’t have to. . . . 
That’s your right. You understand that right?”48 Michael said he understood, waived 
his right to consult with an attorney, and then made several inculpatory statements 
that authorities used to petition the juvenile court, alleging he committed the murder 
and therefore should be adjudged a ward of its jurisdiction.49 Michael appealed to 
have his statements suppressed on the ground that “his request to see his probation 
officer at the outset of the questioning constituted an invocation of his Fifth 
38. Commonwealth v. Markle, 475 Pa. 266, 270 (1977); McCarthy et al., supra note 34, at 452 (citing In re 
J.M.A., 542 P.2d 170, 173 n.2 (Ak. 1975) (“There appears to be general agreement, however, that a 
juvenile is entitled to the Miranda warnings concerning the right to remain silent, the use of any 
statements against him or her and the right to presence of counsel, to be appointed in case of indigency.”).
39. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
40. King, supra note 9, at 447 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979)).
41. Id.; see Grisso, supra note 11, at 5 (“This means that each individual case requires weighing the nature of 
the situation . . . and the characteristics of the suspect.”); Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725.
42. King, supra note 9, at 449. 
43. See id.
44. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 707.
45. Id. at 710.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 711.
49. Id.
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Amendment right to remain silent, just as if he had requested the assistance of an 
attorney.”50
 The Supreme Court held that Michael’s request to see his probation officer 
during the interrogation was not dispositive of whether he invoked his constitutional 
right to counsel because a probation officer may not adequately protect the rights of 
an accused juvenile the same way that an attorney might.51 The Court also reversed 
the California Supreme Court’s holding, which was in favor of suppressing the 
confession, and instead held that the “totality-of-the-circumstances approach is 
adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of 
juveniles is involved.”52 The Court explained:
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the 
juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into 
whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature 
of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.
. . . .
At the same time, that approach refrains from imposing rigid restraints on 
police and courts in dealing with an experienced older juvenile with an 
extensive prior record who knowingly and intelligently waives his Fifth 
Amendment rights and voluntarily consents to interrogation.53
In applying these factors, the Court held that because Michael was sixteen years old, 
had been arrested several times, and had spent time in a youth camp, there was “no 
indication that he was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was 
waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be.”54 And so the totality of 
the circumstances test was thereafter adopted by state courts and codified in New 
York.55
50. Id. at 711–12.
51. Id. at 723–24.
52. Id. at 725. 
53. Id. at 725–26 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).
54. Id. at 726.
55. Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia apply Michael C.’s totality of the circumstances test. King, 
supra note 9, at 452; see N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 305.2 (McKinney 2011); see also Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725.
This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there 
has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved. We discern no 
persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether a 
juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so.
 Id.
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 B. New York’s Approach to the Totality of the Circumstances Test
 Under New York law, a child over nine years old is “presumed competent to give 
sworn testimony in a criminal action or a juvenile delinquency proceeding.”56 New 
York courts allow seven-year-olds to be the subject of juvenile delinquency 
proceedings.57 Unfortunately, there is no age at which it is presumed that a juvenile 
suspect may validly waive his rights.58 In every case, “the determination of voluntariness 
[of waiver] turns upon a judicial assessment of the particular facts and the individual 
characteristics of the juvenile.”59 The FCA mandates, in relevant part, that:
7.  A child shall not be questioned pursuant to this section unless he and a 
person required to be notified pursuant to subdivision three if present, 
have been advised:
 (a)  of the child’s right to remain silent;
 (b)  that the statements made by the child may be used in a court of law;
 (c)  of the child’s right to have an attorney present at such questioning; 
and
 (d)  of the child’s right to have an attorney provided for him without 
charge if he is indigent.
8.  In determining the suitability of questioning and determining the 
reasonable period of time for questioning such a child, the child’s age, the 
presence or absence of his parents or other persons legally responsible for 
his care and notification pursuant to subdivision three shall be included 
among relevant considerations.60
In the absence of parents or an attorney, a juvenile can waive his Miranda rights 
pursuant to the FCA and the “mere failure of the police to seek the additional 
consent of an adult will not outweigh, in any given instance, an evidentially supported 
finding that such a waiver was actually made.”61 In other words, a juvenile’s statement 
can be admissible notwithstanding the failure to notify the juvenile’s parents so long 
as the juvenile has been “Mirandized.”62 Furthermore, the statute allows for parents 
to unilaterally waive their child’s Miranda rights regardless of whether the child 
56. In re Abraham R., No. D-19746/08, 2009 WL 750179, at *10 n.7 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Mar. 20, 2009) (citing 
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.20(2) (McKinney 2011); Fam. Ct. § 343.1(2); In re Noel O., 855 N.Y.S.2d 
318 (2008)).
57. Id. at *10 (citing Fam. Ct. § 301.2(1)).
58. Id. at *9. 
59. Id. 
60. Fam. Ct. § 305.2(7)–(8).
61. Coltoff, supra note 17, § 663 (citing People v. Stephen J.B., 23 N.Y.2d 611, 616–17 (1969)).
62. See In re Raphael A., 385 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1st Dep’t 1976). “Mirandized” means “[t]o read or recite (to an 
arrestee) rights under the Miranda rule.” Black’s Law Dictionary 458 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
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gives consent.63 In addition to biological parents, courts recognize that the FCA 
allows other adults to waive a child’s Miranda rights; such adults include “close blood 
relatives, whose protective relationship with children our society has also traditionally 
respected, as well as non-related adults whose functional relationship with the child 
is equally as close.”64
 In applying the FCA, New York courts analyze a number of factors when 
considering the circumstances surrounding a custodial interrogation of a juvenile. 
The relevant and mandatory factors include: “[1] the age of the juvenile, [2] whether 
or not the juvenile has had prior experiences with the criminal justice system, and [3] 
the presence or absence of a parent, guardian or other supportive adult.”65 However, 
“[t]hese factors are not exclusive and a court may consider any other relevant evidence 
bearing upon the question of voluntariness.”66 The other, less relevant factors not 
required for this discussion are: “the location of the interrogation, the time of day at 
which the questioning occurred, and whether the police took care to fully and clearly 
explain the import of the Miranda warnings to the child.”67 The critical question is 
whether prosecutors can prove, during a suppression hearing, “that the statement 
[made during interrogation] was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt through a 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances.”68
 In a 2008 case, In re Richard UU., the New York Appellate Division, Third 
Department, held that a fourteen-year-old boy voluntarily waived his Miranda rights 
when he was removed from his home and interviewed a day after the crime at a 
reasonable time of day, his caseworker was advised of his Miranda rights at the outset 
of the interrogation, and the boy “unequivocally indicated that he understood his 
rights and was willing to speak with the investigator.”69 Also, the court noted that 
the juvenile had “prior experience with law enforcement and was aware of the 
significance of his Miranda rights.”70 According to the court, this sequence of events, 
along with the juvenile’s criminal history, satisfied the FCA’s guidelines for a 
voluntary waiver.
 In In re Abraham R., a Queens County Family Court held that a ten-year-old 
burglary suspect voluntarily waived his Miranda rights while he, accompanied by his 
father, was interrogated by a detective in a police station.71 After the juvenile’s father 
63. See generally Fam. Ct. § 305.2(7)–(8).
64. In re Abraham R., 2009 WL 750179, at *12 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 310 (1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
65. Id. at *10. 
66. Id. (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).
67. Id. at *19.
68. In re Richard UU., 870 N.Y.S.2d 472, 475 (3d Dep’t 2008) (citing In re Paul QQ., 681 N.Y.S.2d 644, 
645 (3d Dep’t 1998)).
69. Id. at 476. 
70. Id.
71. 2009 WL 750179, at *10. 
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was notified that his son was a suspect, he voluntarily subjected his son to the 
interrogation. The father’s consent satisfied the FCA’s requirement that a juvenile 
suspect’s parents be notified even though at the time of questioning the parents were 
divorced and legal custody of the juvenile was awarded to the mother.72 Because neither 
the juvenile nor his father sought to terminate the interrogation, and the detective 
administered the standard Miranda warnings, the court found that both the father and 
the juvenile “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived those rights and agreed 
that [the juvenile] would speak with [the] [d]etective.”73
 The court also noted that
it has been recognized that “the parent or other legal guardian of a juvenile 
delinquent, or juvenile offender, may invoke the right of counsel on his or her 
child’s behalf.” However, “[i]n order for the right to attach, the invocation of 
counsel by an uncharged defendant or by a parent standing in the defendant’s 
shoes must be unequivocal.”74
 In this case, Abraham’s mother argued that she was the only parent with legal 
custody of Abraham, and that she was the only one who could waive her son’s 
Miranda rights.75 Abraham’s mother alleged that she invoked her son’s right to an 
attorney during the detective’s initial visit to her apartment several days before the 
interrogation.76 However, the court rejected both arguments on the grounds that (1) 
Abraham’s biological father was his legal father, meaning he had a recognized 
parental relationship with Abraham, and therefore the detective had no reason to 
question his status as a parent under the FCA; and (2) Abraham’s mother’s indication 
that she wished to speak to a lawyer at some time prior to the interrogation was 
equivocal and did not amount to a formal invocation of counsel for Abraham.77 In 
the end, the juvenile’s incriminating statements were admitted pursuant to a finding 
that the Miranda waiver was properly upheld as voluntary because the interrogation 
procedures squared with the FCA provisions requiring (1) parental notification, (2) 
the release of an arrested child to his parents, and (3) parental advisement of the 
child’s Miranda rights prior to questioning.78
 Most recently, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in In re Jimmy D.,79 
held that police detectives did not attempt to prevent a thirteen-year-old defendant 
from exercising his right to counsel because his mother gave police permission to 
question her son outside of her presence (effectively waiving her son’s Miranda 
72. Id. at *12.
73. Id. at *9. 
74. Id. at *10 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Mitchell, 2 N.Y.3d 272, 276 (2004)); see also Richard 
UU., 870 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
75. Id. at *11. 
76. Id.
77. See id. 
78. Id. at *10. 
79. 880 N.Y.S.2d 334 (2d Dep’t 2009).
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rights).80 When Jimmy failed to ask for his mother’s presence during questioning, the 
detectives seized the opportunity to tactfully imply that the juvenile might be eligible 
for counseling if he told them the truth about the sex offenses of which he was 
suspected.81 Jimmy inculpated himself in the crimes and his statements were upheld 
as being voluntary.82 In October 2010, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Second Department’s decision because “Jimmy and his mother agreed to his being 
questioned outside his mother’s presence, and there [was] no evidence that Jimmy 
asked for her during the questioning.”83
 In a vigorous dissenting opinion, however, Chief Judge Lippman expressed his 
uneasiness with the 4-3 majority holding in Jimmy D.84 Judge Lippman argued that 
although Jimmy’s initial waiver in the presence of his mother was valid under the 
FCA, once his mother left the room, Jimmy’s waiver was invalidated.85 Furthermore, 
Judge Lippman contested that not only was Jimmy entitled to an attorney, but that it 
was also “obvious, except perhaps to a child, that a confession to criminal wrongdoing 
is not a condition of access to psychological counseling.”86 In the end, thirteen-year-
old Jimmy was denied both the guidance of his mother and the assistance of an 
attorney, “at a time when it would have been crucial to the protection of his interests.”87
 Other jurisdictions outside New York have adopted different procedures and 
considerations when applying the totality of the circumstances test; these safeguards 
provide stronger Fifth Amendment protections for juveniles confronted with a 
decision to waive their Miranda rights.
 C. Comparisons: Other Jurisdictions’ Legal Treatment of Juvenile Miranda Waiver
 Three states in particular, New Jersey, Vermont, and Texas, provide alternative 
and more robust protections for a juvenile confronted with a Miranda waiver decision. 
These protections are practical and unlikely to frustrate law enforcement initiatives. 
For those reasons, the safeguards implemented by these three states should be 
influential in reforming the FCA. These state policies range from placing greater 
80. Id. at 335. 
81. Id. at 335–36.
82. Id. at 336.
83. In re Jimmy D., 15 N.Y.3d 417, 423 (2010). 
84. Id. at 425 (Lippman, J., dissenting).
85. See id. Judge Lippman argued:
It follows that any representation in the course of the interrogation tending to impair 
the interogee’s understanding of the consequences of his or her continuing waiver must 
be deemed to invalidate the waiver and render the product of consequent interrogation 
inadmissible, unless the representations are conclusively shown not to have clouded the 
interogee’s comprehension of the basic risks entailed by continued participation in the 
interrogation.
 Id. at 428 (Lippman, J., dissenting) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). 
86. Id. at 430. 
87. Id.
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emphasis on the child’s age, under the totality of the circumstances analysis, to 
mandating that a juvenile consult with an independent adult prior to an interrogation 
regardless of a parent’s availability.88 While New Jersey is arguably the most protective 
of juveniles under the age of fourteen, Vermont requires some consultation with an 
interested adult regardless of the juvenile’s age, and Texas provides for a neutral third 
interrogation commences. Even though none of these states applies the greatest 
89
appear to use procedures that are more protective than those employed in New York. 
  1. New Jersey
 Two cases decided over the past decade or so, State v. Presha90 and In re A.S.,91 
have recognized the importance of parental involvement with regard to juvenile 
interrogations and Miranda waiver. In New Jersey, “[t]he requirement of voluntariness 
applies equally to adult and juvenile confessions.”92 Generally, New Jersey Supreme 
Court decisions reflect a greater cognizance of a child’s vulnerability when determining 
whether waiver is voluntary outside the presence of a parent.93 In contrast to New 
York, New Jersey’s jurisprudence on juvenile Miranda waivers places the greatest 
weight in the totality of the circumstances analysis on age and the parent’s presence or 
absence.94 Moreover, New Jersey courts have consistently held that the totality of the 
circumstances analysis cannot be applied to juveniles fourteen years of age and 
younger.95 As such, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that “when a parent or 
legal guardian is absent from an interrogation involving a juvenile that young, any 
88. See, e.g., Vt. Const. ch. I, art. X, § 1; State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108 (N.J. 2000); In re E.T.C., 449 
A.2d 937 (Vt. 1982). 
89. See supra text accompanying note 24.
90. 748 A.2d 1108. 
91. 999 A.2d 1136 (N.J. 2010). 
92. See e.g., Presha, 748 A.2d at 1113 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-40 (2012) (“All rights guaranteed to 
criminal defendants by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this State . . . shall 
be applicable to cases arising under the [New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice]” (alteration in original)). 
93. Presha, 748 A.2d at 1114. For instance, when taking into account
confessions by juveniles of any age, courts should consider the adult’s absence as a 
highly significant factor among all other facts and circumstances. By “highly significant 
factor” we mean that courts should give that factor added weight when balancing it 
against all other factors. By elevating the significance of the adult’s role in the overall 
balance, we are satisfied that the rights of juveniles will be protected in a manner 
consistent with constitutional guarantees and modern realities.
 Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1115 (“New Jersey statutes and court rules contain numerous provisions creating age-differential 
standards set at fourteen.”).
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confession resulting from the interrogation should be deemed inadmissible as a matter 
of law, unless the adult was unwilling to be present or truly unavailable.”96
 The New Jersey Supreme Court held in Presha that having parents accompany 
juveniles during interrogation protects both the juvenile’s interests as well as the 
truthfulness of any statements made to the police.97 In Presha, the court affirmed the 
Appellate Division’s holding that a seventeen-year-old’s confession was voluntary 
after consideration of the totality of circumstances, “including the juvenile’s age at 
the time of his statement, his clear desire to speak outside the presence of his mother, 
his mother’s initial agreement to be absent, and his fair treatment by police.”98
 More importantly, the court also held that the absence of a parent or guardian 
from the interrogation was one of the most significant facts in assessing whether the 
juvenile’s waiver of Miranda was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.99 The court 
noted a caveat, however, that it should treat juveniles under the age of fourteen as a 
“special circumstance” when considering their ability to voluntarily waive Miranda 
without an adult present.100 In that scenario, the parent’s absence will bar the 
admissibility of the juvenile’s inculpatory statement “as a matter of law, unless the 
parent or legal guardian is truly unavailable.”101 For suspects under the age of 
fourteen, the court held:
96. Id. at 1114.
97. Id. at 1113–14 (citing In re Carlo, 225 A.2d 110, 121 (N.J. 1966)). 
98. Id. at 1110. The court made a specific finding as to the totality of the circumstances in that case:
[T]he fact that defendant was just two weeks shy of his seventeenth birthday; defendant 
had extensive prior encounters with law enforcement; had been giving [sic] 
his Miranda rights on several of those encounters; defendant had waived those rights . . . 
in the presence of his mother; defendant had agreed with his mother that she would not 
be present during his interrogation; and defendant had not attempted to either invoke 
his right to counsel or expressed a desire to speak to his mother at any time during the 
interrogation. Further, the interrogation, which occurred in spurts of forty  to fifty 
minute periods, was neither grueling nor strenuous for defendant. Moreover, defendant 
never challenged the truth of his confession nor claimed that his investigators used 
tactics that overbore his will.
 Id. at 1112. 
99. Id. at 1114. 
100. Id. at 1110. “New Jersey statutes and court rules contain numerous provisions creating age-differential 
standards set at fourteen.”  Id. at 1115. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. §  2A:4A-26 (2012)); see also In re 
Registrant J.G., 777 A.2d 891, 904–05 (N.J. 2001) (“Other statutory and rule provisions ref lect the 
important distinction between juveniles over and under the age of fourteen.”); see, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2A:4A-35 (authorizing under specified circumstances the release of juveniles over age fourteen on 
their own recognizance); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-61 (authorizing for juveniles over fourteen retention 
of photographs and fingerprint records for criminal identification purposes).
101. Presha, 748 A.2d at 1110. In any event, the court also held that “[r]egardless of the juvenile’s age, law 
enforcement officers must use their best efforts to locate the adult before beginning the interrogation 
and should account for those efforts to the trial court’s satisfaction.” Id. The court implied this approach 
is consistent with other jurisdictions, like Massachusetts, that adopted similar applications of Miranda 
for younger juveniles. See id. at 1114 (citing Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 
1983)).
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[A]n evaluation of the totality of circumstances would be insufficient to 
assure the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights. Accordingly, 
when a parent or legal guardian is absent from an interrogation involving a 
juvenile that young, any confession resulting from the interrogation should be 
deemed inadmissible as a matter of law, unless the adult was unwilling to be 
present or truly unavailable. That approach is consistent with other 
jurisdictions that have recently adopted the same or similar rule. We cannot 
ignore the immaturity and inexperience of a child under 14 years of age and the 
obvious disadvantage such a child has in confronting a custodial police interrogation. 
In such a case, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances is not sufficient to 
ensure that the child makes an intelligent and knowing waiver of his rights.102
In other words, Presha held that, in New Jersey, statements made during custodial 
interrogations by juveniles under the age of fourteen, and outside the presence of a 
parent, will not be analyzed by a totality of the circumstances test unless every effort 
to produce the parent has proven fruitless. While the availability of the parent is a 
consideration that resembles one of the mandatory factors examined under New 
York’s FCA, New Jersey courts require a rebuttable presumption of involuntary 
waiver. New York, however, simply treats the parent’s presence as one of three factors 
that shares equal weight with both the age factor and the “prior experiences with the 
criminal justice system” factor.103
 Ten years later, in In re A.S.,104 the same court held that in cases involving a conflict 
of interest between the victim and the juvenile suspect’s parent, another adult is 
required to be present to counsel the juvenile.105 In that case, the defendant was a 
fourteen-year-old girl with an IQ of eighty-three.106 The court found that although the 
juvenile’s adoptive mother was present during the interrogation, her presence did not 
adequately protect the juvenile because of her conflicting concern for the victim, her 
four-year-old grandson.107 During the interrogation, the mother read A.S. her Miranda 
rights, and the police “failed to correct the mother’s later misstatements about those 
rights, and failed to stop the inquiry when A.S. ma[de] . . . efforts to assert her right to 
For the purpose of obtaining the waiver, in the case of juveniles who are under the age of 
fourteen, we conclude that no waiver can be effective without this added protection . . . 
that a parent or an interested adult was present, understood the warnings, and had the 
opportunity to explain his rights to the juvenile so that the juvenile understands the 
significance of waiver of these rights.
 Id.
102. Id. at 1114 (emphasis added) (citing In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312 (Kan. 1998)).
103. In re Abraham R., No. D-19746/08, 2009 WL 750179, *10 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Mar. 20, 2009).
104. 999 A.2d 1136 (N.J. 2010). 
105. Id. at 1150.
106. Id. at 1138. An IQ score of eighty-three is considered to be in the “dull normal intelligence [range,] 
which is also considered borderline mental retardation.” Kids IQ Test Center: Discover Your 
Child’s IQ , http://www.kids-iq-tests.com/iqscores/83.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
107. In re A.S., 999 A.2d at 1138.
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silence that were overcome by her mother’s badgering of her in the police presence.”108 
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the court found that the juvenile’s 
confession must be suppressed. Ultimately, the court declined to adopt a categorical 
rule requiring an attorney to be present when there is a parental conflict of interest: 
“based on a familial relationship with the victim or another involved in the 
to fulfill the parental assistance role envisioned by Presha.”109
 New Jersey does not require an attorney to be present during a juvenile’s custodial 
interrogation, even when a parent proves ineffective in preserving the juvenile’s Fifth 
Amendment rights. However, the state does place a heavy emphasis on whether the 
parent is or is not present when balancing the totality of the circumstances to 
determine the admissibility of a post-Miranda statement. The state also ignores the 
totality of the circumstances test, in place of a bright-line rule, for juveniles under the 
age of fourteen unless the parent is truly unavailable. The Presha court noted the 
utility of establishing such a “‘bright line rule’ . . . [because it would] be easy for the 
police to implement.”110  The history of this recognition stems from New Jersey’s 
“statutory and decisional law of a substantial distinction in the criminal responsibility 
of juveniles over and under the age of fourteen [that] traces its roots to the infancy 
defense at common law.”111 Specifically, the “‘infancy defense was grounded in an 
unwillingness to punish individuals incapable of forming criminal intent and thus 
incapable of assuming responsibility for their acts.’”112 This defense is applied to 
children under the age of fourteen.113 In sum, New Jersey jurisprudence on the 
admissibility of inculpatory statements after Miranda has been waived notably 
reflects greater protections for younger juveniles.
  2. Vermont
 The State of Vermont allows for the presence of a parent or guardian, but also 
requires an interested independent adult (not necessarily an attorney) to assist a 
juvenile during a custodial interrogation.114  In accordance with the Vermont 
Constitution, a juvenile’s Miranda waiver is considered voluntary and intelligent 
when the following criteria are met:
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 1150.
110. Presha, 748 A.2d at 1114–15 (citing State v. Hartley, 511 A.2d 80, 98 (N.J. 1986)). 
111. In re Registrant J.G., 777 A.2d 891, 905 (N.J. 2001). 
112. Id. at 906 (quoting Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 
503, 512 (1984) (footnote omitted)). 
113. See id. at 905–06 (citing State v. Monahan, 104 A.2d 21, 28–29 (N.J. 1954)).
114. See State v. Mears, 749 A.2d 600, 604 (Vt. 2000).
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(1)  he must be given the opportunity to consult with an adult;
(2)  that adult must be one who is not only genuinely interested in the welfare 
of the juvenile but completely independent from and disassociated with 
the prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal guardian, or attorney representing 
the juvenile; and
(3)  the independent interested adult must be informed and be aware of the 
rights guaranteed to the juvenile.115
As long as the police ensure that these criteria are met prior to interrogation, a 
juvenile’s Miranda waiver in Vermont will be considered voluntary regardless of the 
juvenile’s age.116
 In In re E.T.C.,117 the Vermont Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the 
Indiana Supreme Court and stated:
This State, like all the others,  has recognized the fact that juveniles many 
times lack the capacity and responsibility to realize the full consequences of 
their actions. As a result of this recognition minors are unable to execute a 
binding contract, unable to convey real property, and unable to marry of their 
own free will. It would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold that one 
whom the State deems incapable of being able to marry, purchase alcoholic 
beverages, or even donate their own blood, should be compelled to stand on 
the same footing as an adult when asked to waive important . . . rights at a 
time most critical to him and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar.118
In this case, Vermont police questioned E.T.C., a fourteen-year-old burglary suspect.119 
At the time of the crime and subsequent questioning, E.T.C. was in the residential 
custody of the State Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services for his role in a 
prior crime.120 Once the police administered the Miranda warnings, the director of 
the department instructed E.T.C. to be “straight” with the police.121 Thereafter, 
E.T.C. made incriminating statements about his involvement in the crime.122 The 
115. In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 930 (Vt. 1982) (citing Commonwealth v. Barnes, 394 A.2d 461, 464 (Pa. 
1978); Commonwealth v. Roane, 329 A.2d 286, 288 (Pa. 1974); Lewis v. State, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142 
(Ind. 1972)); Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10) (emphasis added).
116. In State v. Mears, a juvenile defendant, suspected of a murder, argued that his inculpatory statements to 
police should have been inadmissible because they were made over his father’s objection that an attorney 
be hired to represent the juvenile before questioning recommenced. See 749 A.2d 600, 603 (Vt. 2000). 
The juvenile claimed that he did not have a “meaningful consultation” with his father. Id. at 604. The 
court found that all three of the Vermont constitutional protections with regard to juvenile Miranda 
waiver were satisfied, therefore the juvenile’s statements were admissible notwithstanding his father’s 
efforts to hire an attorney before the juvenile confessed. Id. at 603–04. 
117. 449 A.2d 937 (Vt. 1982).
118. Id. at 939 (alteration in original) (citing Lewis v. State, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141–42 (Ind. 1972)).
119. Id. at 938.
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 939.
122. Id.
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court concluded that because the director of the department did not engage in a 
private consultation with E.T.C., but in fact coerced E.T.C. to testify, the director’s 
involvement was inadequate to protect E.T.C.’s Fifth Amendment rights.123 Ultimately, 
the Vermont Supreme Court held that a “[w]aiver will not be presumed from a silent 
record absent a showing at least of the assistance of an independent, impartial, 
responsible, interested adult consulting with the juvenile.”124 The court’s recognition of the 
importance of independent and private consultation for juvenile suspects arguably 
harkens back to what Miranda warnings ultimately promote, which is the right to 
remain silent during interrogation and the right to consult with an attorney.
 The Vermont courts’ history in recognizing the importance of this type of 
independent consultation, and even representation, for juvenile defendants traces 
back to the state’s guardian ad litem125 provision, which reads:
Whenever a minor is charged with a crime in any court and is not represented 
by counsel the court shall forthwith appoint a guardian ad litem to defend the 
interests of the minor. Whenever the minor is charged with a felony in any 
court, he shall be represented by counsel.126
In applying this provision, the Supreme Court of Vermont held in In re Dobson that 
“[t]he legislature has now made clear [through the guardian ad litem statute] its 
express opposition to uncounselled waiver of rights by a minor in criminal actions” 
and therefore “in all cases where a minor is charged with a crime in any court, a 
guardian ad litem shall be appointed.”127 The court further reasoned that “[t]he 
minor is presumed incapable and under disability, hence the need of a guardian ad 
litem to weigh alternatives for him.”128 Ever since Dobson was decided in 1965, before 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miranda, Vermont has recognized that juvenile 
defendants should always be able to consult an independent third party prior to the 
State’s commencement of criminal prosecution. The E.T.C. court extended this 
notion to custodial interrogations involving juveniles.129
 In essence, Vermont’s jurisprudence reflects the importance of providing juveniles 
prior to custodial interrogation. The state’s hiring of an attorney during every 
interrogation could prove very costly. But, this approach may prove less burdensome 
on a state’s budget, and still provides greater protection than New York’s FCA 
because it presents the juvenile with an opportunity to receive advice and guidance.
123. Id. at 940.
124. Id. (emphasis added). 
125. A “guardian ad litem” is “[a] guardian, usu[ally] a lawyer, appointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit 
on behalf of an incompetent or minor party.” Black’s Law Dictionary 321 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
126. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 678 (repealed 1967). 
127. 212 A.2d 620, 622 (Vt. 1965). 
128. Id.
129. See supra notes 125–27.
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  3. Texas
 In Texas, a juvenile must sign his Miranda waiver in front of a magistrate judge 
before it will be considered voluntary, and before police may begin questioning.130 In 
a 1974 case, In re S.E.B., the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas held that a juvenile’s 
confession was inadmissible because he was not represented by an attorney when he 
waived his right to remain silent, even though he and his parents were advised of his 
Miranda rights prior to the interrogation.131 While this case arguably provided some 
of the most protective safeguards for juveniles facing custodial interrogations, it was 
decided prior to Michael C. in 1979. This case illustrates how, at a point in time, 
courts accorded juveniles the full panoply of Fifth Amendment rights. These rights, 
however, have since been slightly abrogated. Nevertheless, Texas Family Code 
section 51.09 provides, in relevant part, that:
[A]ny right granted to a child by this title or by the constitution or laws of 
this state or the United States may be waived in proceedings under this title 
if: 
(1) the waiver is made by the child and the attorney for the child; 
(2)  the child and the attorney waiving the right are informed of and 
understand the right and the possible consequences of waiving it; 
(3) the waiver is voluntary; and
(4) the waiver is made in writing or in court proceedings that are recorded.132
Even though section 51.09 provides procedural safeguards for children confronted 
with a decision to waive their rights, Texas courts also use a totality of the 
circumstances test to determine whether waiver was actually voluntary.133 For 
instance, courts will look to the juvenile’s intelligence, the length of questioning by 
the police, and whether any aspect of obtaining the waiver was coercive.134 By simply 
the procedural protections that should be afforded to juveniles. A synopsis of the 
legislative history behind section 51.09, which was provided in a concurring opinion 
written by Judge Clinton in Carter v. Texas,135 further sheds light on Texas’s 
procedural safeguards:
130. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.09 (West 2009).
131. 514 S.W.2d 948, 950–51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
132. Fam. Code § 51.09 (emphasis added).
133. See Cammon v. State, 672 S.W.2d 845, 848–49 (Tex. App. 1984) (citing Darden v. State, 629 S.W.2d 46 
(Tex. Cr. App. 1982)). 
134. Id. at 849. 
135. 650 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). 
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In sum, the statutory scheme for taking a confession from a child outside the 
presence of and without concurrence from his lawyer is that he first be warned 
of rights by a magistrate and then, once a confession is obtained, that he sign 
it in front of a magistrate upon a determination that those rights were properly 
waived.136
This additional safeguard ensures that a neutral party, other than the juvenile suspect 
and the police, determines whether the juvenile’s waiver actually was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary. New York State, on the other hand, does not incorporate 
any procedural component to the FCA that would provide an added layer of 
protection for juveniles making such decisions.
 D. A Different Approach: Adopting Other States’ Miranda Protections
 A survey of New Jersey, Vermont, and Texas legislative histories, statutes, and 
jurisprudence proves that more protective methods of determining juvenile waiver 
admissibility are available to New York. While none of these procedures are as ideal 
as a per se rule that an attorney always accompany a juvenile during a custodial 
interrogation, any one, or all of them could potentially revamp the FCA so that fewer 
juveniles face interrogations unaccompanied by an attorney, parent, or interested 
adult. Currently, the FCA fails to adequately weigh the most critical factors in the 
totality of the circumstances test for determining a voluntary Miranda waiver.
III. THE FCA ALLOWS FOR INVOLUNTARY MIRANDA WAIVERS 
 Since New York State codified the Michael C. totality of the circumstances test in 
the FCA, its application by New York courts has allowed for a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment in three separate ways: (1) the test requires that a parent only be notified 
that the juvenile is in custody, but does not absolutely require the parent’s presence 
during interrogation; however, if a parent is present, the parent can waive the 
juvenile’s rights for him; (2) it fails to consider a juvenile’s age as the most relevant 
factor among the others and in turn allows a young juvenile to waive his rights absent 
any consultation with an attorney or third party; and (3) it fails to include as 
mandatory for consideration the presence or absence of an attorney during 
questioning.137
 The root of these problems trace to the legislature’s enactment of the FCA and 
family courts’ application of the same. First, the FCA mandates consideration of only 
three factors, one of which may actually prove to be a harmful consideration: the 
notification/presence of a parent during the interrogation. Second, each factor holds 
no greater weight than the others in a court’s analysis. Finally, these systemic problems 
136. Id. at 799 (Clinton, J., concurring). 
137. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 305.2(8) (McKinney 2011) (“In determining the suitability of questioning and 
determining the reasonable period of time for questioning such a child, [1] the child’s age, [2] the 
presence or absence of his parents or other persons legally responsible for his care and [3] notification 
pursuant to subdivision three shall be included among relevant considerations.”). See generally In re 
Abraham R., No. D-19746/08, 2009 WL 750179 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Mar. 20, 2009).
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are bolstered by the FCA’s text because courts are mandatorily constricted to consider 
only three factors that, when considered together, are not sufficient to determine 
whether waiver was voluntary. Each of these issues will be addressed below.
 A.  The Presence of Parents During Custodial Interrogations Does Not Provide Ample 
Constitutional Protection
 Parents should not be able to waive their children’s rights without first consulting 
an attorney. More often than not, parents fail to consider the consequences of 
Miranda waiver; there has been a long-standing “doubt that many parents have 
sufficient understanding or appreciation of the juvenile’s rights or of the consequences 
of waiver to be able to provide meaningful advice.”138 Empirical evidence suggests 
that most parents do not weigh the “major potential consequences of rights waiver 
[a]s a necessary part of adequate protection for juveniles.”139 For example, in Abraham 
R., the defendant was ten years old, confessed to the crime, and was convicted of 
burglary, in part, because his father waived his Miranda rights on his behalf.140
 A study conducted by psychologist Dr. Thomas Grisso addressed the question of 
whether “parents generally perceive juveniles as having a legitimate claim to silence 
and counsel when suspected of legal wrongdoing?”141 The results of that study, 
among other sources analyzed by Grisso, suggest the answer is no.142 Additional 
evidence shows that, because many parents play a disciplinarian role much like the 
police, their presence can pressure juveniles into confessing instead of remaining 
silent.143 Simply put, the role of parents in the interrogation process can sometime 
cause greater harm to a juvenile’s legal interests.144
 B.  Younger Juveniles Cannot Voluntarily Waive Miranda, and the FCA Does Not 
Adequately Account for Juveniles’ Limited Cognitive Capacity
 While the FCA requires courts to consider factors in addition to the juvenile’s 
age, it fails to recognize that the juvenile’s age should be, more often than not, the 
controlling factor when determining whether waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary. 
Empirical research suggests that “preteen suspects are rarely able to appreciate the 
typical Miranda warnings presented to them, thus making any waiver of questionable 
138. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Waiver of Rights: Legal and Psychological Competence 168 
(1981). 
139. Id. at 189.
140. See In re Abraham R., 2009 WL 750179, at *10.
141. See Grisso, supra note 138, at 168 (emphasis removed).
142. See id. at 168. 
143. Richard Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile Miranda Warnings, 14 Psychol. 
Pub. Pol’y & L. 63, 80 (2008).
144. Id. (“Parental pressure to confess or provide inculpatory information seems at odds with protecting the 
child’s welfare.”) (citation omitted). 
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validity.”145 Because the FCA allows police to seek a Miranda waiver only after 
attempting to notify parents that the juvenile is in custody, the FCA exposes some 
younger juveniles, unaccompanied by their parents or an attorney, to questioning 
about crimes when they do not have the cognitive capacity to fully comprehend the 
consequences of waiver. Even though New York courts also consider the juvenile’s 
prior experiences with law enforcement, “study after study has shown that there is no 
relationship between [the] amount of juvenile court experience and the ability to 
understand the Miranda warnings.”146 Moreover, scientific studies continue to show 
that “younger children lack the capacity to waive Miranda rights.”147 If the FCA 
allows younger juveniles to waive148 their Miranda protections without first conferring 
with an attorney, a parent, an interested adult, or other third party, most juveniles 
will undoubtedly inculpate themselves during an interrogation. The FCA does not 
provide pre-interrogation procedures that sufficiently mitigate the risks of 
misunderstood waiver.149
145. Id. at 82.
146. Grisso, supra note 11, at 11.
This sounds odd until one realizes that (a) some youths with lots of experience do learn 
a lot, and (b) some youths with lots of experience do not learn anything at all by their 
experiences, and (c) the two types nullify each other, so that knowing simply that a 
youth “has lots of experience” is of no predictive value at all when trying to decide about 
degree of understanding.
 Id. 
147. King, supra note 9, at 460. 
The developing body of neuroscience highlights the error in these [Miranda waiver] 
decisions. Compared to adults, adolescents have limited access to their frontal lobes and 
limited ability to coordinate the different brain regions needed for reasoning and 
problem solving. They are unlikely to have working memories adequate to hold all the 
Miranda warnings in mind while considering the ramifications of talking or not 
talking. Formulations of the totality test . . . [do] not protect children from their 
immaturity.
 Id. at 461–62. 
148. The term “waive” is especially difficult for some younger juveniles to comprehend. Rogers et al., supra 
note 143, at 78 (“Of even greater concern, many juvenile warnings expect youthful suspects to 
understand and accurately apply the word waive as a key component of their decision making. However, 
waive requires more than a high school education for adequate comprehension.”). 
149. Additionally, the FCA invites false confessions from younger and easily impressionable juvenile 
defendants. Popular interrogation tactics require police to interrogate under an “assumption of guilt,” 
which has proven, in some cases, to increase the possibility of obtaining false confessions from 
impressionable juveniles. Redlich et al., supra note 6, at 110. The Miranda decision acknowledged that 
police interrogations are “inherently coercive” because the suspect is coerced into confessing guilt via 
“an array of psychologically oriented techniques.” Id. at 109. 
Police typically use three types of techniques to interrogate suspects: (1) Minimization techniques 
that “mitigate the offense or lessen the strength of the evidence, such as feigning sympathy, friendship, 
or understanding, and f lattering suspects”; (2) maximization techniques that “exaggerate the strength of 
the evidence and use a strong-arm approach, such as intimidation and veiled threats”; and (3) “‘trickery 
and deception’ (e.g., telling suspects they have an eyewitness or fingerprints on the weapon when they 
do not) to obtain statements of guilt.” Id. Some interrogation manuals “suggest using the same 
psychologically oriented themes with juvenile suspects as used with adult suspects.” Id. at 110.
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 Furthermore, the age of fourteen is not an arbitrary line. In addition to New 
Jersey, several other states like Kansas, North Carolina, and West Virginia, also 
denote fourteen as the pivotal age at which a court should weigh factors differently 
than with older youths to determine whether a juvenile’s waiver is, in fact, voluntary.150 
Also, a 2008 study examined the correlation between reading levels and juvenile 
comprehension of Miranda warnings.151 The findings revealed that even though the 
“right to remain silent” component of the standard Miranda warning is easily 
understandable, “all other Miranda components require an average of at least a sixth-
grade education for 75% comprehension and close to a ninth-grade education . . . for 
full comprehension.”152 This study further concludes that “ juvenile Miranda warnings 
are far beyond the abilities of the more than 115,000 preteen offenders charged 
annually with criminal offenses.”153
 C. An Attorney’s Presence or Absence Is Not Among the Required Factors
 The FCA requires only three factors be included in the court’s analysis when 
considering the totality of the circumstances: (1) the juvenile’s age, (2) the presence 
or absence of his parents, and whether the parent or legal guardian was contacted, or 
whether there was an attempt to reach them, prior to obtaining a Miranda waiver; 
and (3) the number of previous encounters between the juvenile and law enforcement. 
In practice, New York courts apply several other subordinate factors, as the Supreme 
Court in Michael C. held that totality of the circumstances factors are not exclusive 
and that state courts may consider other relevant factors that can prove voluntariness 
By subjecting juveniles without an attorney to these types of interrogations, the state runs the risk 
of obtaining a false confession from juveniles, undermining our criminal justice system. If a false 
confession is extracted, and the totality of the circumstances is applied to determine whether a child 
under the age of fourteen has waived his Miranda rights without (1) a parent even being present, which 
is arguably no more helpful, and (2) without an attorney being present, then the juvenile runs the high 
risk of being adjudicated for a crime he did not commit, which could have been prevented if he had been 
provided with adequate representation.
On June 16, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court held that police must consider a juvenile’s age before 
questioning in order to decide whether to warn the juvenile about their Fifth Amendment rights. See 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2405 (2011) (“Neither officers nor courts can reasonably 
evaluate the effect of objective circumstances that, by their nature, are specific to children without 
accounting for the age of the child subjected to those circumstances.”). It has been predicted that the 
Court “did not answer all the questions that its ruling may raise in the minds of police officers dealing 
with a youthful suspect” and that “[a]nswers may have to come as lower courts apply the new ruling.” 
Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Children’s Age and Miranda, SCOTUSblog (June 16, 2011, 11:18 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/opinion-analysis-childrens-age-and-miranda/.
150. See Kan. Stat. § 38-2333(a) (2011); In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312 (Kan. 1998) (“We cannot ignore 
the immaturity and inexperience of a child under 14 years of age and the obvious disadvantage such a 
child has in confronting a custodial police interrogation. In such a case, we conclude that the totality of 
the circumstances is not sufficient to ensure that the child makes an intelligent and knowing waiver of 
his rights.”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(b) (2011); W. Va. Code § 49-5-2(l) (2011). 
151. Rogers et al., supra note 143, at 72.
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 75. 
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of waiver.154 Other considerations include the time of day the interrogation occurred, 
the location of the interrogation, and whether the police engaged in a thorough 
explanation of the Miranda warnings.155
 Only requiring courts to consider whether a parent was present during the 
interrogation is not always sufficient for determining the voluntariness of waiver. 
Parents who waive their child’s Miranda rights and submit him to interrogation 
sometimes “lack consideration for the potential effects of the juvenile’s statement on 
adjudicatory and dispositional consequences.”156 Many advocates argue that the only 
adequate protection for juveniles during interrogations is to automatically appoint 
legal counsel prior to a juvenile consenting to a Miranda waiver.157 This is “because 
neither juveniles nor parents can be expected to understand the consequences of 
confession . . . [and] [a]ny parental advice providing less protection than this would 
be seen as placing the juvenile at the mercy of a court system.”158
 These problems create loopholes through which police can obtain involuntary 
waivers from juveniles while staying within the textual parameters of the FCA. In 
essence, the law allows and encourages this type of waiver, which is why it must be 
amended to comport with the Fifth Amendment. The following discussion will 
analyze exactly what changes can and should be made.
IV.  THE FCA SHOULD BE AMENDED TO ADEQUATELY PRESERVE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS FOR JUVENILES
 Although the FCA has many defects that can expose juvenile defendants to 
coercive police tactics, several minor adjustments can provide greater protections for 
juveniles without seriously encumbering New York’s police procedures. Ultimately, 
the FCA’s application of the totality of the circumstances approach in juvenile 
Miranda waiver cases takes into consideration a number of factors, which, when 
considered together, create an illusory safeguard against involuntary waiver. These 
factors appear to be easily satisfied so long as there is no blatant coercion by the 
police in obtaining the waiver, and if reasonable efforts have been made to notify the 
juvenile’s parent that he is in custody and subject to interrogation. This rendition of 
the totality of the circumstances is not enough to ensure Fifth Amendment 
protections for juveniles. Courts should consider factors outside of those mandated 
by the FCA, as originally stated in Michael C., and again reiterated in Abraham R.: 
“[t]hese factors are not exclusive and a court may consider any other relevant evidence 
154. See
inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the 
juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity 
to understand the warnings given him.” (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).
155. In re Abraham R., No. D-19746/08, 2009 WL 750179, at *10 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Mar. 20, 2009).
156. Grisso, supra note 138, at 189. 
157. Id. at 187.
158. Id.
1528
COMING CLEAN: THE EROSION OF JUVENILE MIRANDA RIGHTS IN NEW YORK STATE
bearing upon the question of voluntariness.”159 First, courts do not recognize that a 
parent can have a detrimental impact on a juvenile’s waiver decision during 
interrogation, causing him to prematurely forego the right to silence and inculpate 
himself. At the very least, the New York legislature should mandate that if a parent 
is unavailable then the juvenile must be required to meet with an independent third 
party prior to interrogation.160 Second, for younger juveniles (under fourteen years of 
age), the FCA should deem involuntary all confessions given by those unaccompanied 
by an attorney. And third, the law should require the court to consider whether an 
attorney was present during the interrogation. Presently, the FCA sets an unacceptable 
standard for protecting juvenile Miranda protections, which is precisely why the 
legislature should consider implementing the similar approaches taken by several 
sister states.
 A.  A Parent’s Presence During Custodial Interrogations Should Be Considered an 
Ancillary Factor in the Court’s Analysis, Not a Mandatory One
 There is a marked difference between a parent’s insistence on a child’s best 
child should cooperate with police, sometimes the child’s criminal misbehavior can 
result in parents being angry, which may influence the parent’s degree of interaction 
during the interrogation.161 In these circumstances, it is possible that parents can 
“unwittingly encourage the child to answer questions, not anticipating how the child 
may incriminate him or herself[,]”162 as was the case in Abraham R. Unfortunately, 
the juvenile is the one who suffers the consequences of his parent’s miscalculated 
advice.163 Even though the parent’s motives for waiver could be well-intentioned and 
rooted in a “concern that their child receive treatment, [like A.S.] or [an] expectation 
that the child will learn certain responsibilities by confessing to alleged 
wrongdoings[,]” their motives can be misguided, as demonstrated by the Abraham R. 
case.164 Parental advice and waiver can sometimes overlook the reasons why the 
Supreme Court, in Gault, extended the full panoply of Fifth Amendment protections 
to children.165 But, it appears as though the FCA functions under the assumption 
that “parent[s] will have a sufficient understanding and appreciation of a juvenile’s 
rights and the consequences of their waiver, and therefore can supply the explanation 
159. In re Abraham R., 2009 WL 750179, at *10 (citing Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725).
160. See discussion, infra Part IV.A.
161. Grisso, supra note 138, at 167.
162. King, supra note 9, at 468.
163. See id. (“[T]he good parent may be a lousy source of guidance for the protection of the child’s 
constitutional rights.”).
164. Grisso, supra note 138, at 167. 
165. Id. 
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and reasoning which the juvenile alone might lack.”166 This assumption, as proven in 
Abraham R., is poorly grounded and potentially disingenuous.
 If parents are unaware or do not fully comprehend the importance of their 
children’s right to invoke Miranda protections, then the FCA’s requirement is 
ineffective and provides nothing more than a meaningless safeguard for children. 
Arguably, “[w]ithout attitudes supportive of such a choice for juveniles, it is not likely 
that parents could provide the advice and protection which the Supreme Court in 
Gault believed were due to juveniles.”167 Operating under the notion that parents are 
not always capable of understanding the negative consequences of their child’s 
Miranda waiver, the FCA’s notification requirement might actually hurt, instead of 
assist, juvenile defendants. For this reason, the FCA should require parents to consult 
with an attorney or other interested adult prior to waiving their child’s Miranda 
rights. Considering that children are “unlikely to have working memories adequate 
to hold all the Miranda warnings in mind while considering the ramifications of 
talking or not talking[,]”168 they are at a de facto disadvantage and require, at the 
advice about waiver.
 As adults, parents with the requisite mental state undoubtedly have the capacity 
to waive their own Miranda rights, whereas children fourteen and under lack such a 
capacity.169 Even though some states allow parents to invoke and waive other rights 
on their child’s behalf,170 Miranda rights should be exempted from the list of parental 
privileges. Even an “independent interested adult,” not necessarily a parent, could be 
better suited to help a juvenile in making a waiver decision. Courts have long 
recognized that
special problems may arise with respect to  waiver  of the privilege by or 
on  behalf  of children, and that there may well be some differences in 
the presence and competence of parents. The participation of counsel will, of 
course, assist the police, Juvenile Courts and appellate tribunals in eliminating 
the privilege.171
Notwithstanding these special problems, New York still allows parents to, on a 
whim, waive Miranda for their children absent any input from counsel.172
166. Id. at 166.
167. Id. at 168.
168. King, supra note 9, at 461.
169. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
170. See Fla. Stat. § 549.09(1)(3) (2011) (upholding parental authority to release liability in advance of the 
tort claims relating to injury or death arising from the child’s participation in a commercial activity).
171. In re Robert O., 439 N.Y.S.2d 994, 999–1000 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981). 
172. Dr. Thomas Grisso explains why states, like New York, still allow parents to waive their children’s legal 
rights:
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 B.  Juveniles Under the Age of Fourteen Should Not Be Able to Waive Miranda 
Without First Consulting an Attorney or an “Independent Interested Adult” 
 Currently, New York’s greatest protections for children are reserved for those 
under seven years of age because the state will not allow them to be the subject of a 
delinquency proceeding.173 While children that age should undoubtedly be provided 
the highest protection, the FCA should extend this heightened standard for Miranda 
waiver to children who are old enough to commit serious crimes but still too young 
to appreciate the consequences of waiving their constitutional rights.174 When applied 
to juveniles, Gault and its progeny recognize children’s inability to effectively waive 
Miranda; yet in application, “[t]he decisions that uphold Miranda waivers by 
particularly young children not only apply the totality test in a manner that fails to 
consider the child’s immaturity and incomplete development, but essentially say that 
such considerations are irrelevant.”175 New Jersey’s cut-off age of fourteen provides 
the most protective standard for younger children, protecting those who lack the 
cognitive capacity of adults. The FCA and New York case law, on the other hand, 
merely pay lip service to Gault’s concerns and fail to adequately protect younger 
children who have “limited access to their frontal lobes and limited ability to 
coordinate different brain regions needed for reasoning and problem solving.”176
 Additionally, Professor Kenneth J. King persuasively argues that the totality test 
does not “protect children from their immaturity.”177 When adolescents are confronted 
with a decision about the waiver of Miranda rights, their capacity to comprehend the 
consequences of speaking to police might be hampered simply by their inability to 
remember all of the warnings.178 If scientific research tells us that children might not 
understand Miranda warnings, let alone remember what they are being told, the 
juvenile suspect is already at a disadvantage before he waives these protections. The 
FCA should conservatively account for this type of confusion on the part of the 
juvenile. Currently, it does not. At the very least, by raising the age of when a juvenile 
can actually waive his Miranda
more likely to be capable of comprehending the consequences of waiver.
Whether or not parents have an absolute authority to govern their children’s behaviors 
large part a philosophical and moral question requiring a weighing of doctrine 
concerning the family and the state’s interest in protecting the rights of children. 
 Grisso, supra note 138, at 164. 
173. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.20(2) (McKinney 2011). 
174. See In re Abraham R., No. D-19746/08, 2009 WL 750179, at *10 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Mar. 20, 2009) (“[T]here 
is no age at which it is presumed that an accused juvenile delinquent or a youthful criminal suspect may 
validly waive his or her rights.”). 
175. King, supra note 9, at 461. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 462.
178. Id. at 461.
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 New York’s neighboring state, New Jersey, has long since incorporated the age of 
fourteen into its legal analysis when considering the voluntariness of waiver. Empirical 
studies also suggest that fourteen is an age at which children’s “hypothetical decision-
making capabilities in interrogation scenarios”179 begin to increase. Recently, researchers 
examined a study conducted by Dr. Thomas Grisso that asked 1400 detained juveniles 
about the “best choice” for a vignette character facing a custodial interrogation.180 The 
results showed that fifty percent of juveniles ages eleven to thirteen would confess to a 
crime instead of choosing to deny any involvement in the crime or refuse to speak.181 
Similarly, forty-five percent of juveniles age fourteen and fifteen decided that confessing 
was the best choice.182 Only thirty percent of juveniles age sixteen and seventeen, chose 
to confess.183 The results of this study suggest that “confession rates among youthful 
offenders support the potential for these findings to generalize to actual 
interrogations.”184 By drawing a line at fourteen, as New Jersey does, the FCA would 
ensure that younger juveniles are provided greater protections because of their lesser 
capacity to comprehend the negative consequences of waiving Miranda rights. “[T]he 
contemporary understanding of adolescent brain and psychosocial development shows 
that juvenile courts’ reliance on adult Miranda jurisprudence is misplaced and at odds 
with the due process roots of the protections for children.”185 Therefore, the New York 
legislature should require courts to consider the juvenile’s age, if they are under 
fourteen, as the predominant factor in the FCA totality of the circumstances analysis, 
and mandate that any statements a juvenile makes following a waiver are per se 
inadmissible if made outside the presence of an attorney.186
 C. An Attorney’s Absence or Presence Should Be Among the Required Factors
 Although New York State’s limited resources may hamper such a lofty requirement, 
it would be ideal, and likely the most constitutionally sound approach, to require an 
attorney’s presence at every juvenile custodial interrogation. Considering that sometimes 
parents have proven to be less protective of a child’s welfare in the interrogation room, 




183. Id. at 113.
184. Id. (citation omitted).
185. King, supra note 9, at 461. 
186. The totality of the circumstances analysis would then only be applied to juveniles over the age of 
fourteen. For younger juveniles:
[W]hen we allow judges to indulge in a case-by-case totality analysis and assign 
whatever weight they see fit to their chosen totality factors, we create an unacceptable 
risk that a child who does not understand his or her Miranda rights or the relevant 
circumstances will be found to have made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver 
nonetheless.
 Id. at 477–78. 
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the FCA should include, as a mandatory factor in its totality of the circumstances 
analysis, the presence or absence of an attorney to more accurately determine whether 
waiver was voluntary. An attorney’s presence does not necessarily mean, as some have 
suggested, that juvenile interrogations would cease to exist. As in the adult system, an 
attorney can counsel the juvenile defendant on what types of information to divulge 
York legislature and courts should be cognizant of the disparity between the outcomes 
of juvenile custodial interrogations with an attorney and those without. Furthermore, 
courts should also weigh the attorney’s presence against whether a parent was also 
present. If one or the other was present, the court should account for that in its analysis. 
Similarly, the court should also weigh the presence of both an attorney and parents, if 
necessary. While courts may consider other factors, the presence or absence of an 
attorney should be mandated as a fourth prong in the FCA analysis. Even though 
parental attendance may be all that Michael C. suggests as adequate, in reality, a parent’s 
usefulness pales in comparison to the significant effect an attorney’s presence can have 
on a juvenile’s Miranda waiver decision.187
 The FCA currently leaves open four possible interrogation scenarios for juveniles, 
and only one satisfies the Fifth Amendment’s minimum requirements. In the first 
scenario, the juvenile is interrogated outside the presence of his parents and attorney. 
The second scenario involves the juvenile being interrogated with only a parent at his 
side, which can be problematic for reasons already discussed. The third scenario 
involves the juvenile being interrogated with the counsel of an attorney, which is 
likely the most protected circumstance under the Fifth Amendment. And in the 
fourth, the juvenile is interrogated in the presence of both his parents and his 
attorney. The last scenario can possibly lead to a standoff between the parent, who 
might favor the juvenile “coming clean,” and the attorney, who seeks to ensure that 
his client’s legal interests are protected, which might mean invoking the right to 
remain silent. The courts are not required, at this time, to consider all of the variables 
that can affect a juvenile’s waiver and subsequent confession. Simply adding or 
removing the parent and/or the attorney from the interview room can substantially 
vary the outcome of the interrogation. In the end, proper counseling could make all 
of the difference when considering whether Miranda waiver is in the juvenile’s best 
interest. A parent sometimes does not have the foresight to consider what is in his 
child’s best interest. As a result, the legislature should require the FCA to include 
defense counsel’s presence or absence as mandatory in the totality of the circumstances 
analysis; this factor, alongside the juvenile’s age, should be given the greatest weight. 
Practically, courts can consider additional factors because Michael C. explicitly held 
that the totality factors enumerated are not exclusive, and other factors can be 
considered. Assuming that the attorney is the best counselor available, and not the 
parent, the FCA statute should explicitly require courts to consider the attorney’s 
187. See In re S.E.B., 514 S.W.2d 948, 950–51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
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presence or absence in determining the admissibility of statements made after a 
juvenile’s waiver of Miranda.
 D. What are the Consequences for New York State if the FCA is Amended?
 In Gault, the Supreme Court intended for juveniles to enjoy the full panoply of 
Fifth Amendment protections available to adults. Therefore, state courts and 
legislatures are required to ensure such protections, while also balancing legitimate 
and reasonable law enforcement initiatives. But notwithstanding New York’s interest 
in fighting crime, the right to remain silent is a bedrock protection that the U.S. 
Constitution and the U.S. Supreme Court have recognized as paramount when the 
police and a citizen are in opposition.188 Alternatively, if the FCA is amended 
pursuant to the three proposals listed above, it is likely that law enforcement’s ability 
to gain confessions in juvenile interrogations will only be slightly hampered. The 
amendments, however, will not completely bar police from obtaining confessions. If 
adopted, these revisions to the FCA and my proposals for a change in the court’s 
analysis will (1) require courts to still consider, although not as heavily, the presence 
or absence of a juvenile’s parents during interrogation; (2) require police to interrogate 
juveniles under the age of fourteen in the presence of an attorney; and (3) require 
courts to consider, as the most weighty factor next to age, the presence or absence of 
an attorney during interrogation for all juveniles.
 These amendments seem to be less burdensome on the state than a per se rule 
requiring the presence of an attorney during every interrogation of a juvenile. In the 
past, many researchers and legal commentators have suggested such a proposition.189 
However, such blanket requirements have not been adopted because of the “concern 
that insertion of lawyers into the interrogation room will be a net loss for public 
safety . . . [and that] lawyers will advise children to remain silent and police will 
thereby be deprived of an important crime-fighting tool.”190 Professor King advocates 
that such a requirement is necessary, however, and that commentators’ concerns are 
unfounded, as they rely on assumptions that “children will follow the advice of their 
188. The Supreme Court noted in Miranda v. Arizona that: 
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available 
outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in 
which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled 
to incriminate themselves. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the 
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains 
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist 
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to 
combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights 
and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
189. King, supra note 9, at 475. 
190. Id. 
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counsel” and that their “confessions [will] yield reliable evidence.”191 Regardless of 
whether Professor King is correct, the fact that such a requirement has yet to be 
imposed in any jurisdiction suggests that the concerns are strong enough to dissuade 
any legislature from adopting it.
 However, the modified approach suggested here is likely more palatable for the 
legislature and would adequately balance the rights of younger children (those under 
fourteen) against law enforcement coercion. If the legislature amends the FCA, the 
courts will be better equipped to determine whether a waiver is valid, and the police 
will need to refine their interrogation tactics accordingly. In a case like Abraham R., 
a revised FCA could potentially require a parent to consult with an attorney, or 
require a juvenile’s Miranda waiver to be approved by a magistrate judge. Such a shift 
would better protect juveniles from entry into the criminal justice system, enhance 
the accuracy of the court’s analysis, and prompt police to implement procedures that 
yield more reliable and constitutional results.
 New Jersey applies a similar restriction on interrogations involving juveniles 
under the age of fourteen, and its criminal justice system has not self-destructed as a 
result. In essence, New Jersey’s elevated protections for younger children illustrate an 
admirable balancing of juvenile rights and public safety. Both Texas and Vermont’s 
procedures require an objective third party (a magistrate or adult who is independent 
and disassociated from the prosecution) to determine whether waiver was voluntary 
and not the product of misguided parental advice, “ignorance of rights or of adolescent 
fantasy, fright or despair.”192 If the FCA applied even one safeguard from any of 
these states, it would more adequately ensure Fifth Amendment protections for 
juveniles. Adopting a provision similar to the one from Vermont could prevent 
juveniles from waiving Miranda rights without first consulting an interested adult, 
even if the juvenile’s parent is present or truly unavailable or even unwilling to attend 
the interrogation. Creating a presumption against voluntary waiver for defendants 
under the age of fourteen, like in New Jersey, could potentially avoid Jimmy D. issues, 
and would require a juvenile’s willing parent to be present during custodial 
interrogations, contrary to police efforts to separate juveniles from their parents. 
While parents have sometimes proven to be detrimental to juveniles’ Fifth 
Amendment protections during interrogations, their presence, along with that of an 
attorney or other independent party, can provide juveniles with more protections. 
And finally, adopting a procedure similar to section 51.09 of the Texas Family Code 
could establish an additional safeguard without foregoing the well-established 
totality of the circumstances approach for determining validity of waiver.
 This proposal does not suggest that the FCA should abandon the Michael C. 
amended and applied only to older juveniles, who are arguably more adept at 
comprehending Miranda based on their reading level and better evolved maturity. 
While there will always be outlier cases where older juveniles with learning 
191. Id. at 475–76. 
192. In re Gault, U.S. 1, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
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disabilities or deficient education will suffer under the totality approach, this proposal 
is practicable and would not overburden the juvenile justice system.193
V. CONCLUSION
 Unfortunately, there are no indications that the legislature or New York courts 
are seeking to revamp the FCA’s totality of the circumstances analysis. Indeed, based 
on the Court of Appeals’s decision in Jimmy D., New York courts will likely continue 
applying the FCA’s current framework notwithstanding its inadequate constitutional 
protections for juveniles. The evidence is overwhelming with regard to younger 
juveniles’ lack of capacity to comprehend Miranda warnings and the ramifications of 
waiver decisions. Similarly, for decades, parents have proven to be ill-equipped, or 
even detrimental, in assisting their children in the interrogation room. Simply put, 
attorneys can provide the greatest protection for juveniles, while leveling the playing 
field on which waiver is determined to be voluntary or involuntary. By reorganizing 
the FCA’s procedures according to how other states (specifically New Jersey, Texas, 
and Vermont) approach the application of Miranda to juveniles, New York will 
finally be capable of protecting juveniles from involuntary waivers. The Court of 
Appeals will likely revisit the Jimmy D. issue, and perhaps it will hold similarly. 
Change is likely to be slow-moving in the legislature and in the courtroom until a set 
of facts that demonstrates gross police misconduct or a miscarriage of justice rises to 
the surface. For the time being, however, New York seems content on continuing to 
treat juveniles as adults during interrogations, even though they lack adult cognitive 
capabilities.
193. The proposals for revamping the FCA would likely and most noticeably benefit the younger and more 
impressionable juveniles because they provide for the assistance of counsel in every interrogation. Of 
course, tweaking the totality test’s factors would also benefit older juveniles, but the “age” factor is what 
will require police to refrain from interrogating younger juveniles without an attorney. However, for the 
older juveniles (ages fourteen to eighteen), would revamping actually matter considering the rise of the 
“stop snitching” counterculture in urban environments? See Jack McDevitt & Jorge Martinez, Treating 
Juveniles as Juveniles, Project R.I.G.H.T. Inc., http://www.projectright.org/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=71& Itemid=85 (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). Today, it appears that more and 
more juveniles are reluctant to talk to police, let alone confess to them about their crimes. Mostly, there 
seems to be a great fear among younger people who do not want to give off the appearance of being a 
“snitch” or informer for the police. See Gregory Kane, ‘Stop snitches’ campaign could be fatal for enablers, 
Wash. Exam’r (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/node/156671. 
Attacking this problem is an issue that this note does not broach. Indeed, not enough evidence has been 
accumulated to determine whether the “stop snitching” campaign will negatively inf luence the outcome 
of police interrogations involving juveniles.
